President Mwinyi has been expressing views about architecture which seem to be in some sympathy with those of Prince Charles. He is quoted in the October 13 issue of the Daily News as having said in Zanzibar that architecture should focus on the need for privacy, the desire for beauty and the serenity of a harmonious environment. These human needs, he said, should not be held hostage to fashion or technology.

“There is much to learn from the experience of earlier generations, gathered by centuries of trial and error, before we seek to discard this legacy for the often illusory promise of solutions imported from the western world” he told an international seminar organised by the Aga Khan Award for Architecture.

Explaining that the pressing demands of a modernising world were straining the continued existence of a historical inter-cultural architecture in Eastern Africa, the President stressed the need to preserve and enhance the indigenous heritage. He commended efforts being made to preserve this heritage, citing the Bahari Beach Hotel buildings and the Mosque at the University of Dar es Salaam.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW ARMY

(Extracts from a paper presented by Col. F.S. Swai at the International Conference on the Arusha Declaration)

THE COLONIAL PERIOD
The colonial army – the Kings African Rifles (KAR) – was both a pan-territorial army and a segment of the British army with allegiance to the Queen and empire. KAR soldiers did not have to serve in their country of origin but could be stationed anywhere in East Africa. At the time of independence there were two battalions of the KAR – the 6th in Dar es Salaam and the 2nd in Tabora. The total strength was around 1,500 soldiers.

INDEPENDENCE AND THE MUTINY
At independence, the new government of Tanganyika took over the two battalions and renamed them the Tanganyika Rifles (TR). An arrangement was made for the soldiers who had been recruited in Kenya and Uganda to return gradually to their respective countries while those from Tanganyika who were serving outside could equally do the same. But apart from the change of name and the moving out of non-Tanganyikan soldiers, the military establishment remained the same both in its composition and its ideology. The so-called martial tribes (in particular the Wahehe and Watende (Wakuria)) constituted the bulk of the soldiers while the command structure remained British. The 29 British officers, under a British Brigadier, were retained in the army and given the task of training the locals until such time as they were able to manage their own affairs. But if the past was to be taken as the British pattern of promotion then it was going to take many years before the command structure would be completely nationalised. This structure of command, dominated by white officers imbued with their racial superiority and looking down upon the African officers and the rank and file and the dim prospects for change, despite the changed political situation, was to become a source of tension and the major contributor to the military mutiny in 1964.

In the end the native rank and file thought that they had no alternative but to resort to mutiny to air their grievances. The grievances were basically two. The soldiers wanted British officers removed and they wanted an increase in pay and the restoration of certain fringe benefits.

The mutiny was organised by a handful of local rank and file. Initially it was only the battalion stationed in Dar es Salaam that was involved. They were poorly trained and armed and yet they managed to put a whole government machinery to a standstill from January 20th to 25th 1964. This was possible despite the good organisational set-up of TANU throughout the country. For five days neither the Party nor the government machinery managed to organise any local resistance. On the other hand, the suppression of the mutiny required only a handful of British marines.

Hence we find that by January 1964 Tanganyika, like most other independent African countries, had a military that was too small for the defence of the territorial boundaries and unreliable for national reconstruction.

After the mutiny all private soldiers were dismissed and sent to their home villages. Their place had to be taken by recruitment of fresh youth.

DESIGNING THE NEW ARMY
In designing the new army the government and the Party took into consideration three factors. In the first place, while immediately after independence the government and Party had tried to find ways of accommodating different sectoral interests such as those of the trade unions and the civil service, the same was not done for the military. The military did not identify itself with TANU policies, nor did the leaders of TANU have any contacts with the military. The military was taken as an apolitical institution. Secondly was the fact that most of the nationalist leaders who had struggled for independence saw high government posts which were to be vacated by the colonial administrators as the quickest means of amassing wealth and leading a comfortable life. In this struggle for sharing the ‘National Cake’ the military was ignored and left out. A third factor was the obvious weakness of the political system demonstrated by the mutiny and its later suppression.

In designing the new army the military was no longer to be taken for granted. Its place in the political set-up had to be well defined so that it identified with the policies of the Party and the government.

THE ARMY IS STRENGTHENED
The period between 1964 and 1967 was crucial in defining the role that the military would play in Tanzania.

It was in 1964 that the first shots were fired by FRELIMO to mark the launching of the guerrilla war against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. Tanzania was to become the rear base for this protracted war. The OAU had also selected Dar es Salaam as the Headquarters of the Organisation for African Unity’s Liberation Committee which was covering all the other liberation movements in Africa as well. To the political leadership in Tanzania, this position that the country was taking up had to be backed up by a stronger military than two battalions of the TR.

It was also during the period of 1964-67 that the country had to demonstrate its non-alignment. Unlike the time when all weapons systems had come from NATO the army started to acquire arms from the Eastern block and especially from China. The Canadians were called in in 1966 to train in administration while the Chinese came for tactics in 1967.

After 1964 the Tanzania Peoples Defence Force (TPDF) as it was now known had three infantry battalions – in Dar es Salaam, Tabora and Nachingwea. The air transport battalion was started in 1964, the tank and armour battalion in 1965 and a navy unit in 1967.

INVOLVING THE WHOLE POPULATION
Concrete measures had to be taken to involve a greater part of the population in defence matters. In 1966 a National Service Act was introduced. This required all youths finishing high school or doing any advanced training after Form IV to join the National Service.

Idi Amin’s coup in Uganda made it crucial for the political leadership to secure army loyalty in Tanzania. Previous to this there had been the abortive invasion of Guinea by Portuguese forces because of that country’s support for the liberation movement in neighbouring Guinea Bissau. There was fear that something similar would happen in Tanzania because of its support for FRELIMO in Mozambique. The suppression of the attack on Guinea by a citizen militia led the Party to call for a similar type of military preparedness in Tanzania. Serious involvement of the masses in military preparedness came about therefore after the Party Guidelines (MWONGOZO) were issued in 1971. TPDF instructors were sent to every district and work place throughout the country to provide military training. Militia training is done in the evening after the normal working hours and it takes up to four months to complete the course. Recruitment of the militia is done by the Party at branch level. After training, personnel become part of the reserve army but its command is directly under the Party and not the military. The use of the militia during peace time is to perform police and security duties.

Next followed changes in the composition of the regular army. From 1976 a TPDF Bill was passed in Parliament to the effect that only officers, non-commissioned officers and technical personnel would be employed by the army on a permanent basis. The rest of the rank and file would join the army on a contract basis after which they would go home to form part of the reserve army, while fresh recruits were taken from the National Service. This policy of involving the masses proved its worth during the 1978-79 war between Tanzania and Uganda. Every level of the Party had to mobilise for the front or rear defence work. In this way it proved possible, within two months, to raise an army of 50,000 men that finally brought down the Idi Amin government in April 1979. After the war demobilisation was done by the Party in the same way. Some of the militia were returned home (this exercise took only one month); the bulk of the militia remained in uniform and constituted part of the now much larger TPDF.

POLITICISATION
After the mutiny Mwalimu Julius Nyerere called on TANU youths to volunteer for army service. Selection was undertaken by Party branches on the basis of commitment to and identification with the Party and its policies. This process produced 500 new recruits. But this number was not enough for the new army. Hence there was a selective recall of former members of the TR. As long as they had not been directly involved in the masterminding of the mutiny they could be recalled. By this process most of the former TR soldiers were taken back. However, they had to become TANU members.

In this way we find that since its formation in 1964 the TPDF was made up of soldiers who identified themselves with the ruling Party. The soldiers not only undertook professional training but were also subjected to political education. This education emphasised the history of the nationalist struggle for independence and the goals of the Party and political leadership in creating a unified nation. Under the Arusha Declaration the role of the army was defined as that of being a vanguard for the building of socialism and as a college for defence and socialism.

When addressing soldiers in Zanzibar in 1973 Mwalimu Nyerere said …. “there is no single African country which will succeed to build socialism and bring respect to the African man without making its army accept socialism; if our army accepts socialism no one will be able to prevent socialism in our country.”

After the 1971 Party Guidelines there was instituted a system of Political Education Officers most of whom had graduated from the Party Ideological College in Kivukoni. It was their responsibility to raise the level of political consciousness of the soldiers at each level. Around 20% of training time is allocated to this.

The army was organised on the basis of ‘democratic centralism’. Thus the control of the army by the Party organ is found at the national level. But below this level the Party operates as two parallel organs in the army and outside. The major difference is that, while in the civilian organisation of the Party the chairmen of the various organs are elected and do not have government executive powers, in the case of the army, the chairmen of the various organs are not elected and hold their positions by virtue of their executive powers in the Command structure. For example, the moment one is appointed a battalion commander one automatically becomes the chairman of the Party branch in the battalion. Similarly, one cannot become a branch chairman in the army if one is not first appointed battalion commander. Whoever is appointed the Political Commissar of a formation in the army automatically becomes the secretary of the Party at that level. Apart from these two posts of chairman and secretary all other committee members in the army are elected according to the Party constitution and procedures. In Party meetings an atmosphere is created whereby the ordinary soldier can ask about and criticise Party policies and their implementation. But the success of the meetings depends very much on the ideological clarity of the chairman and his secretary in creating an atmosphere of free discussion, given the strong command powers they possess.

WARIOBA STRESSES MILITIA TRAINING
Prime Minister and First Vice-President Joseph Warioba has called on the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF) to step up militia training in order to contain incidents of burglary and crime in general. Mr Warioba, who was speaking at the Monduli Military Academy on September 24th 1988, said that in times of peace defence forces should be utilised in internal security matters. He therefore urged the TPDF to understand the new militia policy – Daily News

AN OPEN UNIVERSITY
The Daily News reports that Tanzania’s Ministry of Education has appointed a 14 man task force ‘that will be responsible for the setting up of an Open University.’ The Chairman is the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam, Mr. Nicholas Kuhanga.

PRESIDENT MWINYI AND MOTHER TERESA
As President Mwinyi’s motorcade was leaving State House to drive out for lunch on its way to the airport on October 31, 1988 the President heard that Mother Teresa, who was in Tanzania for one day to attend a ceremony in which eight new sisters of her order took their vows, was just entering the gates. He thereupon immediately demonstrated his respect for old ladies (Mother Teresa is 79) by breaking his journey and returning to State House to welcome her. Mother Teresa looked delighted by the President’s gesture. “I have nothing to give you. But this is what I have” she said. She presented the President with a statue of the Virgin Mary – Daily News

BRITAIN DOUBLES AID TO TANZANIA
Sir Geoffrey Howe visiting Dar es Salaam in September 1988 announced that British project aid would be increased to £18.0 million in the 1988/89 year, a 50% rise on the previous year. Sir Geoffrey also handed over 15 new trucks (part of a consignment of 30) for use by the Cooperative Unions in the Western cotton growing areas.

Speaking about the Economic Reform Programme at a dinner hosted by the Tanzania Government the Foreign Secretary said that he would like to salute the courage of President Mwinyi and all Tanzanians in pursuing “this hard but necessary road.”

DEALING WITH CRITICS
Zanzibar Chief Minister Dr. Omar Ali Juma has said that his government will not resort to repressive measures to deal with a clique of critics as long as actions by these adversaries do not develop into conspiracy or sedition against the state.

“The government has no intention of enacting a detention law or embark on mass arrests of dissidents because this will abort the democratisation process” he said.

The government was keeping dossiers on people engaged in anti-government activities to ascertain that their actions would not breach peace and security in the Isles – Sunday News

FIGHTING CASHEW NUT DISEASE
A fungal mildew disease of cashew nuts, known as Powdery Mildew is considered by the Ministry of Agriculture to be the main cause of the drastic reduction in cashewnut production in Tanzania from 145,000 tons in 1974 to 22,000 tons last year.

Now, in a project jointly financed by the government and the World Bank, a serious attempt is being made to check the disease. Dr. A.B. Shresta, an agronomist with the FAO has said that trials carried out in 1986 and 1987 showed that, where crops were sprayed with sulphur compounds, increases in yields of between twenty five and eighty per cent had been achieved.

According to Deputy Agriculture Minister, Amran Mayagila, large quantities of sulphur dust and blowers have been imported and a major campaign has been launched – SHIHATA

Tanzania’s Education for Self-Reliance Policy together with Universal Primary Education (UPE), both of which caught the world’s attention as the country’s proudest achievements in fighting ignorance still do not have very much to show in achievement.

The present crisis of primary school leavers, as exemplified by the flooding of urban areas with an influx of young semi-literates who cannot get a place in secondary school or fit into rural life in their villages, appears to be both confusing and compounding.

It is confusing because the introduction of self-reliance was meant to adapt pupils to the realities of a country in which 95% of the population lives in a rural environment. The education reform was also meant to be a means of slowing the rural exodus into the cities, thus lowering the unemployment rate and preparing the youth for appropriate roles in society and working towards better living.

But twenty years later the migration of youths from the villages to urban centres has increased; so has the youth’s disillusionment as they confront the growing appreciation that urban streets are not paved with gold. And along with this disillusionment the young people question and disregard the relevance of mainstream social values, leading sociologists to fear that the costs of this attitude to individuals and the nation may be monumental. What worries them is the number of those growing up with a limited and hostile sense of life. For many, they say, the future is tightly hemmed in by horizons so narrow that moving out of poverty seems unthinkable. With no capital to make a living in their villages most of these youths, some as young as fourteen, drift to urban areas where, finding no reliable source of income, they soon drift into alcoholism, drug abuse, burglary, armed robbery, stowing-away and other unbecoming behaviour like prostitution.

But in a country where education has long been considered to be one of the basic social needs and accorded a high status, the situation raises some controversial questions.

Officials blame the young people who enjoy the benefits of a free education and go on to spurn facilities which society places at their disposal. But critics think society itself is to blame as these young men and women are merely victims of circumstances and forces they cannot control. As soon as they come out of school a stark, colourless life without any support is what greets them in the poor villages. Squeezed between poverty and indifference the urban streets look like the only outlet to them.

Critics of the existing education system say the problem has been caused by ignoring actual facts in overall education planning, notably the economic structure of the country and its growth trends which limit and overestimate employment opportunities.

Ministry of Education officials however counter that the current educational and economic systems in the country clearly depict the spreading of modern agricultural methods and appropriate technology, especially in the Villages. And while UPE has raised the literacy rate from 41% to 85% and this may have resulted in a considerable gap between the appreciation of rural facilities and their availability this is an achievement and a situation which every level-headed Tanzanian has to understand rather than condemn. The officials maintain, and very rightly perhaps, that those who feel disillusioned with the current situation in the villages do so for their own selfish ends and not because of lack of government goodwill and efforts to develop them – SHIHATA

August 28th 1988 was Census Day in Tanzania. After months of preparation some 50,000 enumerators began updating the statistics on Tanzania’s population.

The last census was in 1978 and estimated Tanzania’s population at 17,512,610. Assuming a growth rate of 3.2% p.a. the population is now estimated at 23,997,000.

Apart from the general population census certain sections of the community were asked to provide more detailed information. Do you speak Swahili? What is the highest formal education you have received? Do you have water, electricity in your house? were among the 32 questions asked of this sample.

Many people complained that they had not been counted on Census Day. Miss Lucy Lameck, the National Census Commissar, explained that there had been problems because of rain in certain areas, shortage of forms, changes in maps and failure of some enumerators to turn up. Miss Lameck was confident however that everybody would have been counted during the following few days.

A provisional estimate of the result was expected by the end of the year. Final figures would not be available until 1992 – Daily and Sunday News

A direct link between improved cotton production in Shinyanga and the rapidly increasing popularity of ox carts has been painted out by Emmanuel Bulugu writing in a recent issue of the Sunday News.

The article explained how cotton production had dropped in the region in the mid 1970’s partly because of the villagisation programme. For peasants who wanted to continue to use plots they had previously cultivated in villages which had then been abandoned, long distances became an obstacle not only to continued cultivation of the crop but also the harvesting. The peasants did not have time to make the long journeys involved.

However, with the advent of animal drawn carts in Shinyanga, things are now changing for the better. The carts have greatly simplified transportation of the cotton from distant plots to primary cooperative societies.

The whole business is in private hands. One entrepreneur was said to have started with one cart in Shinyanga town. Each weekend he would go to town to collect the money his previously unemployed ‘driver’ had earned for him. Soon he had bought three more carts for work in the town and two which he employed in carting crops in his village. Now many others are following his example and areas previously too far away to be cultivated are coming back into production.

The carts are not being manufactured only in Shinyanga. There are now private cart makers in several urban areas including Maswa and Lalago. The carts are well constructed with pneumatic tyres on vehicle axles and expensive timber is used in their construction. Cart makers are charging Shs 50,000 to 70,000 per cart.

The British Government’s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) makes an annual grant to the British Council specifically aimed at assisting the development of higher education in the Third World. One of the most important means currently used to achieve this aim is support for academic links with British institutions. In 1987/88 Tanzania benefitted from the largest ODA link budget in Africa.

Academic visits represent the core of the activity. This year it is planned that 47 Tanzanian staff members will be attached to departments in British universities or polytechnics for an average duration of 13 weeks. The purpose of these visits varies according to the needs of the Tanzanian department but are typically designed to exploit the facilities of the host university to advance the visitor’s research, but sometimes will also include attendance at short courses. This year it is also planned that 36 British academics will visit their link departments in Tanzania for an average duration of four weeks.

Typically they will help to advance joint research with Tanzanian colleagues, advise on curriculum development or, sometimes, teach.

The British Council provides an annual grant for most linked departments to acquire equipment in Britain. This year it averaged £3,180 per link. Books have been provided – to the value of £8,900 for the University of Dar es Salaam and £3,600 for the Sokoine University.

Links with the University of Dar es Salaam include :
University Administration – University of Bath;
Geography – University of Glasgow;
Sociology – University of Hull;
Foreign Languages and Linguistics – University of Lancaster;
Epidemiology and Biostatistics – University of Manchester;
Chemistry – University of Salford;
Commerce and Management – University of Sheffield,
Education – University of Southampton;
Statistics – University of Southampton.

There are also three academic links with Sokoine University of Agriculture:
Development Studies – University of East Anglia;
Veterinary Medicine – University of Glasgow;
Rural Economy – University of London, Wye College.